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the most scurrilous political diatribes in newspapers would be un-
likely to harm the republic. From his mid-nineteenth century van-
tage point, he relished the clashes of partisan newspapers as healthy 
and inevitably leading to social and political stability. 
Protecting the Best Men is not as strong in its discussion of the 
twentieth century. Libel cases of the last decade or two are dis-
cussed almost perfunctorily. Further, Rosenberg may not be criti-
cal enough of the legal establishment to suit some observers. He 
suggests that the proliferation of libel suits has stemmed from more 
journalists producing more column inches about events of greater 
public interest. Now there are also more lawyers in the U.S.-
about 650,000, or two-thirds of the world's supply. Separate 
courses in media law are offered in many law schools-adding 
mightily to the several lectures that used to be devoted to defama-
tion and invasion of privacy in torts courses roughly twenty years 
ago-so that the frequency of lawsuits against the media in the 
1980s is not surprising. (The old saying goes, put one lawyer in a 
town; that lawyer will starve. Put two in a town, they will both get 
rich.) 
Beyond Professor Rosenberg's splendid beginning, there is 
much work to be done, much reinterpretation. As he observes: 
Indeed, the prominent libel battles of the mid· 1980's-General Ariel Sharon versus 
Time, Inc., William Tavoulareas versus Washington Post Co., and General William 
Westmoreland versus CBS-assumed the character of trench warfare involving elite 
members of the modern corporate-military order. If, as some observers insist, late 
twentieth-century politics revolve around a new kind of "feudalism," might not 
many modern liberal trials be seen as contemporary versions of baronial conflict 
among the self-styled best men? 
TAKINGS. By Richard A. Epstein.t Cambridge, Ma.: 
Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. xi, 362. 
Edward Foster2 
Public law, argues Professor Richard Epstein, should be a co-
herent and consistent extension of the individual rights that are se-
cured by private law. Although public law covers relationships 
between groups, these must be translatable into statements about 
individuals; public law should not deny rights that the government 
is pledged to protect in private law. Takings argues that the origi-
I. James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
2. Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota. 
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nal constitutional design did make public law consistent with pri-
vate law, and that the massive expansion of government power in 
this century (zoning, rent control, workers' compensation laws, 
transfer payments, progressive taxation) is largely inconsistent with 
the Constitution. It follows that the Supreme Court's decisions up-
holding these violations of individual rights were mistaken. 
Professor Epstein's claim rests mainly on the eminent domain 
clause ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation"). But his argument is not narrowly legalistic. 
His reasoning draws heavily on economics, and he asks the econo-
mists' question: When do private markets fail, so that regulation is 
justifiable? 
A theory of public law must derive from a theory of the state. 
Epstein joins the framers of the Constitution in starting from 
Locke's contractarian theory: the purpose of government is to exert 
the police power which protects each from the aggression of others 
who might threaten life, liberty, or property. With social order es-
tablished, industry will flourish because it is then reliably rewarded; 
the institution of government causes total output to increase, so that 
all may benefit. The central challenge for constitutional law is to 
make certain that all do benefit, and that the government claims 
only those resources needed to perform its functions. 
Unanimous consent to each government action would offer one 
way to keep government in check, but sheer numbers of persons, 
and the threat of strategic behavior, rule out that standard. Locke 
was willing to settle for tacit consent by the governed coupled with 
exhortation to the governors. Epstein rejects Locke's solution, for 
fear that it may permit a voracious government to take more than 
the governed wish to provide, for purposes that they do not ap-
prove. Rather, he proposes that relations between the government 
and the governed be based on "an explicit and rigorous theory of 
forced exchanges" in which the owner must receive as compensa-
tion for any taking of property by the state, and as part of the same 
transaction, an equivalent or greater value. He goes further and 
argues that "just compensation" requires that any net gains from 
government activity should be distributed in the same proportion as 
the initial distribution ofwealth.3 Moreover, the purpose of govern-
ment should be sharply circumscribed: 
[T]he entire system of governance presupposes that in a state of nature there are 
two, and only two, failures of the system of private rights. The first is the inability 
3. Epstein states both that gains from government should be distributed in accordance 
with the initial distribution of wealth and that they should be congruent with the distribution 
of taxes. The two may not be the same. 
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to control private aggression, to which the police power is the proper response. The 
second is that voluntary transactions cannot generate the centralized power needed 
to combat private aggression. . . . As these two problems are the only ones that call 
forth the state, so they define the limits to which the state may direct its monopoly 
of force. The theory that justifies the formation of the state also demarcates the 
proper ends it serves. 
From these premises Epstein reaches the conclusion that many 
twentieth century government actions are inconsistent with the 
eighteenth century Constitution. Before evaluating this conclusion, 
I will describe his reasoning in greater detail. 
I 
Professor Epstein defines "taking" broadly, to include any ac-
tion which diminishes the value of private property, as well as the 
actual transfer of physical ownership; his definition differs from the 
Supreme Court's in that it includes taking from large groups, 
though each individual loss is small, as well as from small groups, 
each member of which suffers substantial loss. Thus, neither regu-
lations nor taxes nor modifications of liability rules for private con-
tracts can be excluded from the effect of the eminent domain clause. 
Next comes the analysis of the possible justifications for a gov-
ernment taking of private property. Epstein lists three: the police 
power, consent to the taking (or, in case of accidental taking, volun-
tary assumption of risk by the owner of the property taken), and 
just compensation given in exchange for property taken for a public 
purpose. Just as takings must be defined broadly, the possible justi-
fications must be defined narrowly so as to protect the individual 
against government power. 
Use of the police power justifies a taking only when it is in-
tended to protect against a threat to life, liberty, or property; it is 
not justified when it is intended merely to provide a public benefit. 
Thus an environmental regulation designed to prevent pollution 
that harms others is a valid exercise of the police power, and re-
quires no compensation; but a restriction on billboards designed 
simply to improve the view does require compensation.4 
Even when the end is justified by the police power, the means 
employed must be appropriate and as unintrusive as possible: the 
evils of drink do not of themselves justify closing a brewery, and the 
risk of fire does not suffice to justify restrictive zoning ordinances.s 
4. Epstein acknowledges, and rejects, arguments by Sax and Michelman suggesting 
that there is no analytic difference between the two. Insofar as the issue is economic and not 
legal I agree with Epstein's position, but it is not central to this discussion. 
5. Indeed, Epstein's main complaint against zoning ordinances, one of his list of twen-
tieth century innovations that lack solid constitutional basis, is not that they cannot be justi-
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Epstein points out that the "public purpose" test for takings 
has become virtually inoperable, with any remote connection to the 
public welfare being adequate justification for taking property under 
eminent domain. He argues that the public purpose requirement 
should be revived and assigned a central place in eminent domain 
law. His basic reason is the one that preoccupied Locke: to protect 
against the government's use of its powers, in this case eminent do-
main, to reward its own supporters at the expense of others. The 
more widely benefits are dispersed among the populace, the less 
danger that a taking, even a compensated taking, will confer a bene-
fit on a favored few at the expense of others. This consideration, I 
think, explains his proposal that "public purpose" should be inter-
preted to mean benefits distributed roughly in proportion to initial 
wealth or to the amount of tax paid.6 The use of such a test would 
give the courts a means to judge whether or not a particular taking 
was unfairly biased toward one group at the expense of others. 
The final issue in Epstein's basic argument is the definition of 
"just compensation." He adopts definitions that seem obvious and 
sensible from the viewpoint of economics, but are not always ac-
cepted by the courts. First, compensation should be based on the 
market value of the property taken (not some lower "reasonable 
rate of return on original investment," as in rent control laws). 
Compensation may be implicit, and in kind rather than in cash: the 
landowner prohibited from putting up a large sign receives compen-
sation in the fact that his neighbor is similarly prohibited. Owners 
of a common pool of petroleum or gas each benefit from regulations 
designed to maximize the total extracted; so do the creditors of a 
bankrupt benefit from regulations designed to maximize the total 
recovered from his estate. But in such cases of implicit in-kind 
compensation, individuals must be protected against bearing a share 
of the burden out of proportion to their share of the benefit. 
What are the concrete implications of all these principles? 
Here are some of Epstein's illustrations: 
fied under the police power, but that they have not been so justified; there has been 
inadequate exploration in landmark cases of whether less costly and less intrusive alternatives 
would have accomplished the important public ends being advanced and of whether particu-
lar ordinances were essentially discriminatory takings for the purpose of redistributing wealth 
from one group of landowners to another. 
6. Epstein does provide an exception for cases of necessity, such as a mine, a railroad 
or a dam, in which the benefit may accrue to private persons; in such cases he is concerned 
with the likely difference between market value of the condemned property and the value in 
use to the owner: because the owner had not voluntarily sold at the market price it is manifest 
that the value in use exceeds the market price, though we cannot know by how much. Ep-
stein argues that in such cases it is appropriate to insist on payment of a bonus over market 
price, plus any legal costs, to make a crude attempt to compensate for value in use rather than 
value in exchange. 
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1. When introduced in the first quarter of this century, workers' 
compensation statutes offered an exchange in which both employers 
and employees gave up something. To compensate workers for job-
related injuries, employers gave coverage even when not negligent 
in exchange for lower levels of recovery and a simplified procedure. 
In light of lower administrative costs, it is possible that all could 
gain by substituting this system for common law litigation. How-
ever, this possible justification is made suspect by the fact that such 
statutes were defended, when introduced, as a way to redress the 
imbalance of bargaining power between employer and employee, a 
consideration that could be used to void virtually all private con-
tracts, since bargaining power is rarely equal. Moreover, changes in 
the laws since their introduction may well have converted an origi-
nally fair bargain into one which is now lopsided. A provision in 
the original statutes to allow employer and employee to opt out of 
the system by contract might have provided adequate protection, 
but absent such a provision Epstein regards the statutes as 
unconstitutional. 
2. Government regulation of railroads and public utilities is justifi-
able, because the grant of eminent domain to such firms for their 
distribution networks represents a taking from the public; to then 
prohibit their exploitation of a monopoly position is simply a way to 
assure that the public receives just compensation for the original 
taking. But other regulations of prices, wages, and interest rates 
have no similar defense and are unconstitutional. The National La-
bor Relations Act, with its restrictions on freedom of contract, also 
fails for lack of just compensation. 
3. In the area of taxation, excess profits taxes are clearly a taking 
without compensation, as are state severance taxes on the extraction 
of minerals. And lacking any clear evidence that the benefits of 
government are distributed so as to increase more than proportion-
ately with wealth or income, the progressive income tax is also a 
taking without just compensation: its impact on the rich is dispro-
portionate to the benefit they receive. 
4. Finally, transfer programs ranging from Social Security and 
Medicare to unemployment compensation and welfare programs all 
suffer from the same flaw as the progressive income tax: the affluent 
have a disproportionately low probability of benefiting from such 
programs and bear a disproportionately high share of the cost. The 
result is a taking without just compensation. 
II 
As an economist, I will not presume to evaluate possible juris-
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prudential objections to Professor Epstein's thesis. Much of what 
he says will make sense to economists of various political inclina-
tions. His main objective is to protect against "rent seeking"; that 
is, the practice of devoting resources to obtaining income by polit-
ical means through transfer payments, tax exemptions, or favorable 
regulations. Economists (and Epstein) deplore rent-seeking, on the 
ground that it diverts energies from productive activity in the mar-
ketplace and leads to an overall diminution in prosperity, making us 
all worse off. Although I am an unreconstructed, bleeding-heart 
liberal, I agree that rent-seeking is a major problem. Rent-seeking 
activity benefits the poor so infrequently and so ineffectively, and 
others so often, that the poor might very well be better off if the 
Constitution were interpreted as Epstein wishes. 
Nevertheless, I have some reservations about Epstein's argu-
ment. These reservations revolve primarily around the issue of 
transfer payments for welfare programs, and they arise from several 
points of view. Let us start by treating social welfare programs as 
an insurance plan. As Epstein points out, private insurance mar-
kets can fail for two reasons: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection occurs when the buyer of insurance knows the 
risk better than the insurer does, which tends to lead to high-risk 
people insuring, while low-risk people decide not to insure, creating 
a situation in which insurance rates rise until low-risk people who 
wish to insure cannot afford to do so if they are unable to prove that 
they belong in a low-risk category. Moral hazard is the phenome-
non that those who are insured against an event lose some of their 
incentive to prevent it from happening. When either of those two 
problems is present, insurance will be unavailable or too expensive 
for some potential buyers. State provision of the insurance cannot 
solve the problem of moral hazard, but it can solve the problem of 
adverse selection, because compulsory insurance for all means that 
no insured person can take advantage of private information to opt 
in or out of the system. 
Some of the misfortunes and choices that lead to poverty-
catastrophic fires, for instance--can be insured against in the pri-
vate market. But others-bad genes, a rotten environment, etc.-
cannot. Compulsory government "poverty insurance" is therefore 
at least fairly plausible from an economic point of view. 
On the other hand, compulsory insurance does involve the con-
siderable social cost of involuntary participation by those who dis-
like the idea. Professor Epstein rejects the insurance rationale for 
transfer payments, on the ground that the insurance is not fair to all 
the parties. We do not all start out in identical circumstances, and 
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if some of us, endowed by fortune with better prospects, are re-
quired to buy insurance that is a bad bargain, there is a taking with-
out just compensation. 
Let's look at the problem from another angle. From the view-
point of those affluent individuals who lose by participating, a 
poverty program amounts to a forced charitable contribution; to an-
alyze this requires consideration of another form of market failure, 
one not discussed by Epstein. Like other "public goods," charitable 
contributions are plagued by the "free rider" problem.7 If, as a 
contributor to charity, my concern is with alleviating hunger rather 
than with the psychic reward that might come from basking in the 
public or private knowledge of my generosity, I will benefit more 
from having other people alleviate poverty than from doing so my-
self; if others share my concerns but also my selfishness, there will 
be less charity than we would each prefer to have unless we can 
arrange a social pact to jointly contribute.s Persons who are so mo-
tivated will support some level of tax for such a charitable purpose 
and up to that level will receive just compensation through an im-
plicit payment in kind. So some of those who at first sight appear to 
suffer from an involuntary welfare program are not in fact harmed 
by it. 
At this point the argument for or against welfare programs 
looks much like the argument for or against military expenditures. 
In either case everyone receives the benefit whether or not he wants 
to receive it, because if it is to be provided it must be provided for 
all. In the case of national defense Epstein comes down on the side 
of provision, despite the fact that not all will approve: 
When the United States government decides to commit troops in foreign combat, its 
actions will be supported by some and opposed by others. Nonetheless, the consti-
tutional command for a single foreign policy (actually, physical constraints rather 
than any constitutional provision] ... makes it impossible to simultaneously satisfy 
all points of view. To insist that classic public ... goods provide equal subjective 
benefits, much less benefits that exceed tax payments, is entirely inconsistent with 
our (indeed any) system of organized government. Some measure of equality may 
be provided simply because the government makes an enormous number of collec-
tive decisions that are supported by different groups for their own reasons. For 
some persons the balance will not even out in the long run. The price of collective 
life is that disappointed citizens cannot obtain tax refunds for unwanted public ac-
tions, either case by case or on an aggregated basis. 
7. A free rider enjoys the benefit of a good (such as an open-air concert, unscrambled 
radio signals, or national defense) without paying for it. The phenomenon does not arise with 
ordinary private goods, consumption of which is limited to the person in possession. 
8. Put another way, if 10,000 people each pledge to contribute $100 on the condition 
that everyone else does the same, each individual knows that his $100 contribution will guar-
antee that $1 million goes to the charity. Without the pact, a $100 contribution delivers only 
$100 to the charity. Standard fundraising techniques exploit this fact. 
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In the case of transfer payments Epstein comes down on the other 
side of the argument Why so? Once we consider the public good 
aspect of involuntary charitable contributions, I do not see that the 
logic is any different. In either case one must decide whether the 
general good justifies coercion of those who do not approve. 
Even if we remove the public good aspect of private charity by 
postulating that every donor's satisfaction comes only from public 
admiration for his generosity, society might still agree that a safety 
net, to help people in desperate cases, would be a legitimate joint 
responsibility best undertaken by government. Whether or not con-
stitutional scholars would unanimously support the notion that pro-
tection of life, liberty and property includes an obligation for public 
support in cases when children and incompetents cannot obtain 
food, shelter, and clothing, economic thought would certainly ac-
cept that as a legitimate cause for government action. 
The same arguments may also justify some degree of progres-
sivity in the income tax. At least for the very lowest levels of in-
come they justify collecting no taxes at all. Such an exemption 
imposes a primitive progressivity on the tax schedule, in that the 
total tax paid as a fraction of income then increases with income, 
even though each dollar of extra income incurs the same tax burden 
for those who pay taxes. 
Another issue is suggested by unemployment insurance. Per-
haps the government policies that would be permissible under Ep-
stein's reading of the Constitution could never lead to inflation or to 
government actions designed to reduce aggregate demand in order 
to stop inflation. I am skeptical that this outcome could be assured; 
and failing it, we should address the fact that anti-inflationary pol-
icy can put people out of work, creating a taking for which they 
deserve just compensation: "landing nets for the front-line troops 
in the battle against inflation," in Walter Heller's ringing phrase. 
Following Epstein's reasoning, there is no particular justification for 
funding these payments by a tax on employers (and employees); in 
exchange for the general benefits provided by effective inflation con-
trol, they should be funded from the general revenue. 
So much for my first set of reservations about the book's eco-
nomic analysis. It is difficult to tell whether or not to place any 
great weight on my remaining reservation because, while Epstein 
enunciates the principle clearly, he does not appear to follow it 
strictly. The principle is that net gains from government activity 
should be distributed in the same proportion as the initial distribu-
tion of wealth. My difficulty with this principle is in part practical: 
because most government activities affect the general equilibrium of 
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the economy, shifting prices and income flows in complex ways, it 
would not be possible to control the net effect except with an intru-
sive system of individualized taxes and transfers; moreover, in most 
cases it is impossible to predict the precise consequences of any spe-
cific government action, so it would not be possible to do what Ep-
stein suggests. 
More than that, Epstein's proposal sets a standard for govern-
ment programs that is extraordinarily rigid compared to the stan-
dard suggested by the private market mechanism: a private bargain 
can be struck with any distribution of the gain. We presume that a 
trade entered into voluntarily by two competent individuals will 
make both better off. Epstein proposes a much more rigid standard 
for trades undertaken through the medium of the government: a 
specific distribution of the gains. I think that the Epstein standard 
is not workable (as suggested by the fact that he is willing to settle 
for other criteria in specific cases that he analyzes in his book). But 
the purpose of the standard, as I interpret it, is simply to give us a 
tidy criterion for judging whether or not any particular government 
program is designed to funnel benefits to a favored few. It is possi-
ble that judges could address that question without the rigid distri-
bution requirement that Epstein imposes. 
* * * 
I have discussed only the bare bones of Takings. It is a much 
richer book than one might infer from my review, and wise in dis-
cussing how to accommodate the principles Epstein advances to the 
world as it is, which includes many settled programs and conse-
quent expectations that violate those principles. As a layman, I find 
Professor Epstein's thesis both stimulating and attractive. As an 
economist, I find his reasoning consistent with modern economic 
thought. It is only in some particulars that I disagree with his con-
clusions. For the most part those conclusions are consistent with 
economic theory and with the policy prescriptions that most econo-
mists-liberal or conservative in politics-would support. I am 
pleased to recommend the book both to constitutional scholars and 
to economists concerned with public policy issues. 
